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1.

Introduction
Wholly owned foreign subsidiary (WOFS) entities have and continue to be important vehicles for firms seeking to capitalise on foreign market opportunities, particularly with the removal of foreign ownership barriers throughout the world (Colombage, Gunasekarage, and Shams 2014) . However the success of such ventures is mixed (Eden and Miller 2004) and accordingly investigating a comprehensive set of control determinants and the associated control mechanisms is a fundamental step. The objective of this paper is to investigate the choice of management control systems exercised by headquarters controlling WOFS operations, broadly based on a transaction cost economics (TCE) approach proposed by Speklé (2001) .
The motivation for conducting this study is twofold. First WOFS entities are an integral and economically significant part of the Australian economy. The net value of Australian companies abroad is appropriately AUD$875 billion and this continues to expand between AUD$20 million and AUD$30 billion per year, with much of it relating to WOFS operations 1 . Hence we aim to provide some guidance to practice concerning the management control systems exercised and characteristics associated with these choices. Our second motivation is that much of the research in this area frequently considers only a narrow set of control choices (Bourmistrov and Kaarbøe 2013; Dossi and Patelli 2008) . It is surprising there is not more comprehensive consideration of controlling WOFS, particularly concerning research in the Asia Pacific region (Chenhall and Smith 2011; Benson et al. Forthcoming; Benson, Faff, and Smith 2014) , given the importance of these entities for multinational corporations and control problems faced (Mason 2007 ). Accordingly we aim to develop a more comprehensive approach by drawing from Speklé's (2001) TCE theory of management control as a starting point in this study.
1 See Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australia Economic Indicators, September 2014.
The WOFS context is characterised by some unique factors, aligning with TCE theory. These include internal networks, external networks and strategic choices which are critical to the viability of WOFS operations given the knowledge acquisition they facilitate (Forsgren, Pedersen, and Foss 1999; Tallman and Fladmoe-Lindquist 2002) . These network and strategic factors lead to a variation in knowledge at different organisational levels, a key driver of headquarters degree of uncertainty concerning WOFS operations (Williamson, 1979) . Further, networks developed and strategic choices are related to the asset specificity of WOFS operations and post hoc information impactedness from headquarters' perspective (Williamson, 1979) . Therefore WOFS operations can be characterised according to the link between activity traits (uncertainty, asset specificity and post hoc information impactedness) described in transaction cost economics (TCE) theory and the problems headquarters face, which can be addressed through management control systems. A number of studies assert the relevance of TCE theory to aid in the explanation of control choices, including Spicer and Ballew (1983) , Bogaard and Speklé (2003) .
We start by conducting a series of exploratory interviews to gain an insight into the applicability of TCE theory and modify Speklé's (2001) conceptualisation consistent with the control choices and associations with activity traits observed in the WOFS context. These insights inform the development of a survey we conduct, so it is meaningful in the context examined (Abernethy et al. 1999) . Survey data is collected from 159 firms to more comprehensively examine the control of WOFS operations. Our findings indicate that headquarters do not choose a single set of control choices, as proposed by Speklé (2001) , rather they choose combinations of the sets of control proposed. These sets of control choices are associated to a certain extent with the activity traits observed.
This study contributes to literature in a number of ways. First, literature concerning the control of foreign subsidiaries rarely distinguishes between wholly owned operations and joint venture operations (Jaussaud and Schaaper 2006) . Generalising the implications of findings from this literature is problematic, given headquarters controlling joint ventures are faced with unique issues associated with sharing control, bargaining power and competing partner interests (Chalos and O'Connor 2004; Emsley and Kison 2007) . Headquarters controlling WOFS operations need to deal with and control foreign operations alone, in sometimes unfamiliar markets. Second, literature often deals with one or a limited number of control mechanisms in each study (such as performance measurement systems), rather than more comprehensive sets of control mechanisms or control packages (Sandelin 2008; Malmi and Brown 2008) . Through examining this unique context and broader set of control choices within it, we contribute to developing a more comprehensive understanding of that is relevant to both theory development and practice (Merchant 2012 ).
The next section explains the implications of TCE and Speklé's (2001) theory which we refer to when examining this context. The suggestions, from a series of exploratory interviews, then provide insight into TCE applicability in this context. The analysis of the survey data is then presented, following by the findings and conclusion.
Theory development
Control problems facing headquarters and transaction cost economics
The problems headquarters face when controlling WOFS operations at a distance are captured through the activity traits described in TCE theory (Williamson 1979 (Williamson , 2005 . In this study activity traits are essentially descriptors of a WOFS (domain of transactions) from the perspective of headquarters. Activity traits in the presence of human traits, bounded rationality and opportunism, are argued to lead to control problems. This section defines and describes these activity traits and associated human traits in the context of WOFS operations.
Uncertainty refers to the specificity of intended performance and activities of WOFS operations (ex ante) and is associated with the predictability of the WOFS context (environment). Behavioural uncertainty is very relevant, in this context, based on headquarters' familiarly with subsidiary practices and processes associated with foreign markets, particularly concerning government regulations, local customs, business networks and market developments (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997) . Unfamiliarity arises in many cases due to the distance between headquarters and WOFS operations (Moilanen 2007) . Bounded rationality, referring to limited cognitive and computational ability to arrive at decisions (Simon 1945) , is problematic where uncertainty is high due to the limits on headquarters ability to effectively provide direction at a distance (Williamson 1979 (Williamson , 2005 .
Distinct control problems occur when uncertainty is combined with a second activity trait, asset specificity. Asset specificity refers to the extent it is possible to redeploy asset to an alternative activity, with larger opportunity costs associated with higher specificity (Williamson 1979) . Opportunity costs may be further increased in this context due to limits on headquarters' ability to reallocate assets to alternative uses at a distance. High asset specificity is related to opportunism, referring to self-interested behaviour of WOFS operations employees at the expense of headquarters in this study (Williamson 1975) . It is expected headquarters use control choices to minimise the risk of loss associated with opportunism, possibly more problematic and difficult to deal with at a distance.
The third activity trait in TCE theory is ex post hoc information impactedness, referring to the degree of asymmetry between headquarters and WOFS operations concerning performance achievements (Williamson 1979) . Asymmetry can only be equalised between these two parties at a cost which is substantial in some cases (Williamson 1996) . Such asymmetry may be particularly problematic and high concerning WOFS operations, given the distance from headquarters resulting in high ex post information impactedness. High ex post hoc information impactedness may lead to opportunistic behaviour by WOFS personnel, with higher probability of such behaviour at a distance, which headquarters needs to address.
It could be argued that activity traits (and the presence of human traits) do not capture the entirety of factors effecting control choices. While this is true, the advantage of applying the TCE theory perspective in this study is it may provide a parsimonious perspective on the instrumental factors effecting control choices, rather the fragmented approaches in literature.
Management control archetypes and transaction cost economics
Given activity traits appear to provide a relevant and parsimonious perspective on the WOFS operation context, we now need to consider the implications of these on the control choices of headquarters. Speklé's TCE of management control provides a conceptualisation of the link between activity traits and control choices. Our intention in this study is not to test Speklé's (2001) theory, but rather use it as a starting point to more holistically consider control choices in this context. Speklé's (2001) framework consists of five control archetypes 2 , which are each aimed at addressing distinct control problems associated with different combinations of uncertainty, asset specificity and ex post hoc information impactedness (Williamson 1979 (Williamson , 2005 . The choice of appropriate control archetype is argued to be the one that will economise the transaction costs associated with the domain of transactions (the WOFS in our study). In this section we detail the control archetypes and explain the expected associations with activity traits. (Williamson 1979; Williamson 2005) Archetype 1: Arm's length control Arm's length control is characterised by headquarters extending high autonomy to WOFS management, within a framework of targets, monitoring, evaluation and rewards of subsidiary management according to market benchmarks. This archetype is appropriate, according to Speklé (2001) , in situations of low uncertainty, where WOFS performance and activities can be specified ex ante, and moderate asset specificity 3 , allowing the use of market benchmarks. In this situation WOFS management decision making is likely to exhibit very little bounded rationality, due low uncertainty and specificity of performance and activities ex
ante. In addition headquarters is likely to face little opportunism from WOFS operations due to the large number of headquarter options associated with resource reallocation, associated with moderate asset specificity (Williamson 1979) . Accordingly Speklé (2001) argues extending high autonomy to WOFS management and monitoring, evaluating and rewarding based on market benchmarks is a sufficient means of control.
Machine Control
Machine control archetype is appropriate where, according to Speklé (2001) , uncertainty is relatively low and asset specificity is relatively high. High asset specificity means it is difficult for headquarters to deploy WOFS assets to alternative activities. Opportunistic WOFS management decisions further exacerbates the potential losses in a context of both limited alternative asset deployment opportunities and limited visibility of WOFS operations from the perspective of headquarters. The specificity of WOFS performance and activities ex ante, low uncertainty, by headquarters provides a means of using this archetype to mitigate opportunistic behaviour. According to Speklé's (2001) headquarters choice of either action or results oriented machine control is dependent on its ability to define output targets which are meaningful and sufficiently restrictive.
Archetype 2: Results oriented machine control
This archetype is characterised by extending high autonomy to WOFS management with an emphasis on providing direction through targets internally developed by headquarters. These form the basis of monitoring, evaluating and rewarding subsidiary management. This is argued to be appropriate in situations of high asset specificity, possible under low uncertainty, and, according to Kruis (2008) 4 , low ex post hoc information impactedness.
Essentially Kruis (2008) extends the implications of Speklé's (2001) argument, arguing that the choice of machine control is dependent on headquarter's ability to define meaningful and sufficiently restrictive output targets through the connection with ex post hoc information impactedness. If headquarters can define sufficiently restrictive administrative targets which address the risk associated with high asset specificity, this is a reflection of limited information asymmetry between WOFS management and headquarters concerning performance achievements, and results oriented machine control is the most relevant archetype according to Speklé (2001) . Results oriented machine control is efficient from a headquarters' perspective, compared with the substantial costs of exercising action controls from a distance. Market benchmarks are not available where asset specificity is high due to the relative absence of comparable direct competitors performing similar activities (Anand and Singh 1997) .
Archetype 3: Action oriented machine control
This archetype is characterised by relatively low to moderate autonomy extended to WOFS management and clear standardisation of behavioural expectations. Headquarters place strong importance on compliance with standardised behaviour, rules and procedures, through closely monitoring WOFS operations (Speklé 2001) . It is argued to be appropriate in situations of relatively high asset specificity, protecting difficult to redeploy assets where there's the potential for opportunism, possible due to low uncertainty and, according to Kruis (2008) be worthwhile (Williamson 1975) .
Archetype 4: Boundary control
This archetype involves a high degree of autonomy being extended to WOFS management with clear guidelines concerning behaviour and activities not to be engaged in. Headquarters closely monitor compliance with these boundaries and take action against subsidiary management if they are breached. Essentially Speklé (2001) argues headquarters are limited to this archetype choice where uncertainty is relatively high, inability to specify WOFS performance and activities ex ante, and ex post hoc information impactedness is high, significant asymmetry between WOFS management and headquarters concerning performance achievement. In some cases, this archetype may be particularly relevant when controlling WOFS operations, due to the distance from headquarters (Hansen 2002; Schulz 2001) . Defining the domain of responsibility minimises the risks associated with bounded rationality and/or opportunistic decisions as it prevents, theoretically, WOFS management from taking action or making decisions outside their domain of responsibility. Headquarters is argued to be limited to this archetype regardless of asset specificity levels, which is why this activity trait is argued not to affect the control choice in this case.
Archetype 5: Exploratory control
This archetype is characterised by high autonomy extended to WOFS management with relevant targets emerging and established during the period, forming the basis of monitoring and evaluating performance. There is significant emphasis placed on assessing and rewarding subsidiary management on the basis of long term performance. This archetype is argued to be appropriate in situations of relatively high uncertainty, due to the inability of headquarters to specify performance and activities of a WOFS ex ante and bounded rationality of decisions if headquarters attempted to do so (Williamson 1975) . Further the use of this archetype is possible where ex post hoc information impactedness is low, due to limited asymmetry between WOFS management and headquarters concerning performance achievements.
Accordingly this suggests headquarters are reliant on low levels of ex post hoc information impactedness as a means of controlling WOFS operations. Similarly to boundary control as above, headquarters only choice of control is argued to be limited to exploratory control in this case and the level of asset specificity is not expected to change this situation or the archetype choice.
Figure 1 below (adapted from Kruis, 2008) summarises the association between activity traits and control archetypes, as predicted by Speklé (2001) . We examine whether these predictions are informative in explaining the control of WOFS operations by headquarters. 
Insights from exploratory interviews
A number of exploratory interviews were conducted with senior managers at five firms involved in the control of WOFS operations to gain an insight into the applicability of the TCE theory of management control in this context. Firm selection was based on those expected to have unique sets of activity traits allowing a comprehensive initial investigation of the theory. These firms operated in industry sectors including pharmaceutical development and manufacturing, construction and development, finance, retail and medical product development. One semi-structured interview, lasting two to three hours, was conducted with a senior manager (including financial controllers, operations directors and chief executive officers) at each firm concerning their control of one particular WOFS.
Based on the exploratory interviews, a number of potential deviations from Speklé's (2001) conceptualisation are observed in the context of controlling WOFS operations. First, while the existence of the control archetypes is observed, multiple control archetypes appear to be adopted by headquarters. This contrasts with the single distinct archetype choices proposed by Speklé (2001) . The distance between the headquarters and WOFS operations exemplifies control problems faced in some cases (Hassel and Cunningham 2004) given certain activity trait levels in isolation (or independently) appear associated with the use of multiple choice archetypes, this suggests considering the effect of combinations of activity traits on control archetype choices is not appropriate.
The interviews indicate, despite the deviations being observed, Speklé's (2001) theory is applicable and useful in conceptualising the control choices and the activity traits that appear to explain variation in these choices. Given our intention in this study is not to test Speklé's (2001) TCE theory of management control, but rather use it as a starting point and means of explaining the control of WOFS operations, the deviations concerning the use of multiple control archetypes and the independent effect of activity traits on control archetype choices have important implications on the research method, the regression analysis, appropriate when examining this context.
Evidence from statistical analysis
Survey method and responses
Data collected through a cross-sectional survey 6 , following the guidance of Dillman (2000) and suggests of literature (Tung 2000) , enables statistical modelling of the associated between activity traits and control choices. Respondents were asked to complete the survey with regard to the management of one WOFS they (headquarters) control. A total of 178 surveys were returned, providing a response rate of 28.80 per cent. After removing nine incomplete surveys and ten relating to subsidiaries with zero employees (dormant subsidiaries) where control is not relevant, 159 usable surveys remained. 7 Respondents appeared to be at the company an adequate period of time (mean 9.58 years) to be sufficiently knowledgeable to answer the questions. There is a large variation in the size of both subsidiaries (1-5,000 employees) and corporations (5-38,000 employees), indicating that a broad range of firms replied to the survey. We include a size control variable in our models to account for variation in control choices according to this variable (explained later in this section The survey instrument is available upon request from the corresponding author. 7 The means and standard deviations of the constructs are compared based on early and late respondents (first and last 40 per cent respectively of useable responses which provided a clear distinction between the initial survey mail out and the later follow up stages). The means of the constructs for early and late respondents are not significantly different, similar as confirmed by the't' statistics, notwithstanding asset specificity where the difference is statistically significant. This difference may be due to the relative ease of contacting managers at headquarters with more asset specific operations, due to the greater risks and consequently closer focus on operations. However, in any case, the size of this difference may not be economically significant and, given all other constructs, are not significantly different we assume that there is no systematic bias in our data.
business involvement. 8 The diversity of WOFS operations in our sample is expected to be associated with a large variation in activity traits and associated problems.
[INSERT The internal consistency of each control archetype construct, with the reflective indicators (composite reliability), is assessed through using Cronbach's Alpha (Cronbach 1951 ). All
Cronbach Alpha values are higher or close to 0.70, reported in Both the individual PCA and composite reliability statistics indicate that the five control archetypes appear to be representative of the sets of control choices exercised.
The discriminant validity of the control archetypes relates to the ability to discriminate a set of indicators measuring one construct from those of other constructs (more variance is shared between the indicators of a construct than any other indicators representing a different construct). It is assessed by comparing the square root of the average variance extracted (AVE) to the correlations between each construct (Fornell and Larcker 1981) , presented in Table 5 below. If the square root of the AVE for a construct is higher than the correlations with other constructs, this indicates acceptable discriminant validity.
[ INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] The value of the square root of AVE for each construct (values in bold) is higher than the Pearson correlations between all constructs, with the exception of action oriented machine and boundary control. Accordingly it may be problematic to discriminate between action oriented machine and boundary control, given they are relatively direct forms of control.
The results of the factors analysis, composite reliability and discriminant validity testing, indicate the control archetypes conceptualised by Speklé (2001) are representative of distinct control archetypes. However, it is important to note these results suggest limits to the degree the archetypes are single independent control choices, as indicated by the lower discriminant validity statistics in some cases. This is consistent with the interview suggestions, that multiple archetypes are used.
Associations between activity traits and control archetype choice
In order to measure both the activity traits and the control archetype constructs, the relevant indicators are combined through simple additive aggregation, consistent with the control archetype constructs. Each activity trait is defined and measured as follows:
i. Uncertainty: The specificity of performance and activities (ex ante) relates to the degree headquarters can provide direction consistent with the goals and objectives of the WOFS operations. Ambiguous goals and objectives are associated with limited headquarters' knowledge of WOFS activities, and accordingly high uncertainty. To measure uncertainty, indicators are adapted from Kruis (2008) and Rainey (1983) based on headquarters degree of clarity in these four areas: clarity of goals; specificity of goals; clarity of goals to outsiders; and goals known to insiders.
ii. Asset specificity: Both human and physical asset specificity are relevant in the context of international operations (Klein, Frazier, and Roth 1990; Sridharan and Akroyd 2011) . Intangible assets relating to branding and product expertise are also relevant in the contemporary business context (Henri 2006) . Accordingly, the following indicators are used to measure asset specificity based on the extent the following factors can be redeployed to alternative uses if WOFS operations cease: employee skills (human); training of employees (human); physical assets (physical assets); technological systems (physical assets); product customisation expertise (product);
and reputational capital (brand name).
iii. Ex post hoc information impactedness: Ex post hoc information impactedness is measured based on the relative information headquarters has compared with WOFS management concerning performance achievements, thereby measuring asymmetry. This is measured using the following indicators, concerning headquarters relative information of WOFS operations compared with subsidiary management, adapted from Dunk (1993) : activities undertaken by subsidiary; operational processes performed by subsidiary; realisation of subsidiary performance potential; impact of external factors on performance; and understanding subsidiary achievements.
The validity of these activity trait constructs was examined through conducting a factor analysis of the indicators to determine the composite reliability and discriminant validity (including control archetype constructs). These statistics indicate the constructs are valid, expected given the well-established nature of these measures. Descriptive statistics of the constructs, minimum, maximum and standard deviation statistics indicate there is significant variation in the data, and no significant floors or ceiling in the data. This alleviates any possible concern of limited variation in activity traits and control archetypes due to the focus on the WOFS operations context.
A series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are run, consistent with insights gained from the interviews conducted. These OLS regressions using continuous variables, based on the simple additive aggregation of indicators for each construct, are appropriate as they allow the effect of varying levels of independent activity traits on control archetypes choices to be examined. Higher construct values indicate higher levels of an activity trait or greater use of a control archetype.
The association between activity traits and arm's length control is tested using Equation 1.
Significant and negative coefficients for α 1 (uncertainty) and α 2 (asset specificity) indicate support for Speklé's (2001) arguments. Moderate asset specificity is argued to be associated with arm's length control; in the hierarchical organisational context this indicates asset specificity is relatively low as low asset specificity is applicable to market based transactions.
Accordingly this is why a negative coefficient is predicted concerning α 2 (asset specificity).
The association between activity traits and results oriented machine control is tested using The association between activity traits and action oriented machine control is tested using Equation 3. A significant and negative coefficient for α 1 (uncertainty), significant positive coefficient for α 2 (asset specificity), and significant positive coefficient for α 3 (ex post hoc information impactedness), indicates support for Speklé's (2001) arguments.
ACTION_CONTROL i = α 0 + α 1 UNCERTAINTY i + α 2 ASSET_SPEC i + α 3 EX_POST_ HOC_INFO_IMPAC i + α 4 SIZE i + ε i (3)
The association between activity traits and boundary control is tested using Equation 4.
Significant positive coefficients for both α 1 (uncertainty) and α 2 (ex post hoc information impactedness) indicate support for Speklé's (2001) arguments.
The association between activity traits and exploratory control is tested using Equation 5. A significant positive coefficient for α 1 (uncertainty) and significant negative coefficient for α 2 (ex post hoc information impactedness) indicate support for Speklé's (2001) arguments.
Not all activity traits are included in all equations (ex post hoc information impactedness concerning arm's length control and asset specificity concerning boundary and exploratory control) as they are not relevant in determining the choices of control (Speklé 2001) .
SIZE is based on the total number of employees (including the focal WOFS) of the whole corporation the headquarters is controlling. Literature indicates size is an important control variable (Chenhall 2003) . We do not include other control variables. The activity traits in TCE theory are argued to be a parsimonious, yet comprehensive enough to explain the control archetypes choices.
The OLS regression results, examining whether activity traits determine the choice of management control archetypes, are reported in Table 6 .
Arm's length control -Equation 1
The coefficients concerning both uncertainty (α 1 = -0.414, t = -1.786) and asset specificity (α 2 = -0.052, t = -0.653) are negative, consistent with predictions. While the uncertainty coefficient is significant at the 10 per cent level, the asset specificity coefficient is insignificant at all conventional levels. The F-statistic (1.978) indicates the model does not have significant predictive ability at conventional levels and the variation in control archetype use explained is quite low (R 2 = 0.018). Accordingly there is little support for the predictions.
Results oriented machine control -Equation 2
All results concerning the coefficients are insignificant ( indicates the model does have significant predictive ability and the R 2 is 0.078.
Action oriented machine control -Equation 3
The results indicate uncertainty (α 1 = -0.249, t = -3.442) is negatively and significantly associated with action oriented machine control, consistent with predictions. Further, both asset specificity (α 2 = -0.141, t = -1.957) and ex post hoc information impactedness (α 3 = -0.294, t = -4.036) are negatively and significantly associated with this control archetype, opposite to Speklé's (2001) predictions. The relatively high F-statistic (10.098) and R square (0.187) indicates the model has significant predictive ability and explanatory power.
Boundary control -Equation 4
The results indicate uncertainty (α 1 = -0.302, t = -4.164) and ex post hoc information impactedness (α 2 = -0.280, t = -3.824) are negatively and significantly associated with boundary control use, the opposite of Speklé's (2001) predictions. The model has high predictive ability and explanatory power indicated by the F-statistic (12.623) and R squared (0.181).
Exploratory control -Equation 5
The results indicate ex post hoc information impactedness (α 2 = -0.246, t = -3.205) is significantly negatively associated with exploratory control, consistent with predictions.
Uncertainty (α 1 = -0.175, t = -2.262) is also negatively and significantly associated with exploratory control, the opposite of Speklé's (2001) predictions. The F-statistic (5.778)
indicates the model does have significant predictive ability and the R 2 is 0.083.
The results indicate some support for Speklé's (2001) predictions and the appropriateness of taking into account the deviations observed from the original conceptualisation in the regression design. While our intention in this study is to examine headquarters' control of WOFS operations, rather than a direct test of Speklé's (2001) original theory, a direct test would serve the purpose of demonstrating whether or not our modified version of Speklé's (2001) theory is more relevant in explaining control choices in this context. Accordingly, before discussing these results further, Speklé's (2001) original theory is tested next.
Additional testing
Speklé (2001) argues particular combinations of activity traits are associated with distinct control archetypes. Accordingly, to directly test the original theory, it is important to identify whether or not headquarters are using a particular control archetype and to determine the association of this choice with the combined variation of activity traits. Consistent with Speklé (2001) , and to test whether control archetypes are determined by combinations of activity traits, we formulate the following multinominal logistic regression: The results 10 indicate that while the model chi-squares are significant and more than 50 per cent of control archetypes are correctly classified, the independent activity trait interaction variable is insignificant in all models with the exception of exploratory control use relative to arm's length control (Coefficient -1.881, Wald 3.056, significant at the 10% level). While 9 T-tests confirm the construct values for the primary control archetype are higher than the non-primary archetype when compared on an individual control archetype construct basis and all control archetype construct basis. 10 In the interests of maintaining the length of this paper to an acceptable level, the results of the additional testing are not reported in table form. However these results tables are all available from the authors by request. Table 6 , are the most significant set of results.
Results discussion
The first set of OLS regression results, taking into account the deviations observed from Speklé's (2001) original conceptualisation, are the most significant set of results. This is consistent with the insights and suggestions from the exploratory interviews. The results are now discussed.
Arm's length control
The regression results indicate, regardless of activity trait coefficients and significance levels, the arm's length control model is insignificant according to the F-stat. This may be related to the context of controlling operations from a distance, where the redeployment of assets is more difficult, and relying on arm's length control as the basis of directing asset use and protection may be not adequate or appropriate in this context (Teece, Shuen, and Pisano 1997; Hansen 1999; Nilsson 2002) . Further, arm's length control involves the establishment of relevant benchmarks and the distance separating headquarters from subsidiary operations means establishing these benchmarks may not be practical compared with home country operations (Zaheer and Mosakowski 1997) . As observed in the interviews, Speklé's (2001) theory may not apply uniformly to all contexts. Headquarters may not consider arm's length control effective, particularly concerning the protection of assets, explaining the insignificance of the arm's length control model.
Results oriented machine control
The lack of significant results for model two could be explained by the wide spread use of results oriented machine control as means of control (Sandino 2007 
Action oriented machine control
Consistent with predictions, uncertainty is significantly and negatively associated with action oriented machine control. Further, it is predicted asset specificity is positively associated with action oriented machine control, particularly given the difficulties of redeploying high specific assets at a distance (Chandler 1991) . The results are opposite to predictions, suggesting headquarters doesn't have sufficient knowledge, resources or confidence to effectively direct the use of highly specific assets at a distance (Monteiro, Arvidsson, and Birkinshaw 2008; Zaheer and Mosakowski 1997) . This suggests it is more appropriate to extend WOFS management autonomy, given their proximity and relative ability to protect and maximise asset returns.
The results also indicate headquarters exercise action oriented machine control to a greater extent where ex post hoc information impactedness low, opposite to Speklé's (2001) predictions. Speklé's (2001) 
Boundary control
The negative association with uncertainty and ex post hoc information impactedness is the opposite of Speklé's (2001) predictions. Accordingly, this suggests the ability to exercise this control archetype may be possible where uncertainty and ex post hoc information impactedness is low. Setting inappropriate boundaries where headquarters lacks the ability to specify the performance and activities of subsidiary activities and performance may significantly impede the autonomy of subsidiary management, particularly at a distance, to maximise returns from operations (Merchant and Van der Stede 2012) . Considering the consequences of inappropriate boundaries, the use of boundary control in situations of low uncertainty and ex post hoc information impactedness appears appropriate.
Exploratory control
The negative association with uncertainty is the opposite of Speklé's (2001) predictions, suggesting the ability to set and monitor relevant targets throughout a period is associated with headquarters' knowledge of subsidiary operations (Ouchi 1979) . Accordingly, rather than headquarters being limited to exploratory control where uncertainty is high, the ability to exercise this control archetype is possible where uncertainty is low. While the activity traits may not have been as comprehensive as expected in explaining headquarters control choices, they still appear to be a parsimonious and informative. The selection of multiple control archetypes to control WOFS operations appears important in this context, given the challenges associated with WOFS operations at a distance. It would be interesting to examine the effect of these control choices on performance in a future study (Speklé and Verbeeten 2013) . This would confirm whether the use of multiple archetypes is an efficient and effective control choice. 
Summary and conclusions
